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Reflections and Reviews
The Moral Complexion of Consumption
ALBERT BORGMANN*
Vigorous consumption is the sign of a prosperous and confident society. Some
critics, however, find a high level of consumption morally objectionable. To see
what is valid in these objections, one needs to understand the connection
between consumption and the characteristic pattern of technology that is high-
lighted by the device paradigm and gives rise to paradigmatic consumption. Such
consumption induces disengagement from reality and a decline of excellence.
The response to these debilities is to accept paradigmatic consumption in some
areas of life and to make room for focal things and practices in others. Research
is needed to determine the social reality, and to probe the common awareness,
of paradigmatic consumption and focal practices.
“Consumption,” Adam Smith said, “is the sole end andpurpose of all production; and the interest of the
producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be
necessary for promoting that of the consumer. The maxim is
so perfectly self-evident that it would be absurd to attempt
to prove it” (Smith [1776] 1985, p. 338). The central and
final significance of consumption has, if anything, become
more obvious in the 223 years that have passed since Smith
publishedThe Wealth of Nations.Vigorous and growing
consumption is the chief indicator of a prosperous and
self-confident community.
Consumption is naturally low when a country is too poor
to produce much. The importance of consumption really
comes into its own, however, when you consider a rich and
productive country that fails to consume confidently. Vig-
orous consumption requires that consumers are confident of
their future earnings and that they enjoy the purchase of
consumer goods. One or both of these conditions may fail to
obtain for virtuous reasons. People may prudently save for
the future or refuse to indulge their greed. In any case, the
body politic begins to suffer from constipation or, worse,
sclerosis. Unemployment rises and public expenditures de-
cline unless they are forced up to fight a recession. Some-
thing like this has been happening in Japan since the early
nineties.
Consumption without corresponding production, to be
sure, can be as debilitating as consumption that lags
behind production. It leads to indebtedness, to inflation,
and sooner or later to an economic correction or decline.
But the painful reengineering and retooling that this
country undertook in the eighties would have been point-
less without the consumer confidence and spending that
have contributed to the astounding economic boom of the
nineties.
It is crucial to realize that the difference between faltering
and growing consumption is not just a matter of abstract
numbers we read about in the papers. In a declining econ-
omy the general mood is bleak; the world begins to look
drab; dwellings are getting shabby. People hunker down and
become suspicious. In a world of vigorous consumption,
you see people swarming about the Home Depot, looking at
paint sprayers, buying plumbing fixtures, and loading up
lumber. Roofs are replaced, kitchens are remodeled, and
plantings are added. Vacant lots are filled, historical trea-
sures restored, and bridges rebuilt. Things look vital and
hopeful.
To live is to consume. Social and philosophical disputes
cannot possibly pivot on consumption versus no consump-
tion. In its most fundamental sense, consumption is the
absorption of something by some object to support the
function or welfare of that object. Plants consume carbon;
animals consume plants; humans consume animals. Con-
sumption in this sense is a condition of life, and no one will
oppose it. Life-sustaining consumption, however, can be a
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simple affair and under natural conditions remains roughly
constant per organism.
CRITIQUES OF CONSUMPTION
For at least a hundred thousand years, humans as hunters
and gatherers lived in these natural circumstances. The
fairly steady state of consumption began to be overtaken by
significantly growing consumption in the nineteenth century
and has kept growing since. This consumption in excess of
sustenance is often what is meant by critics when they use
the term “consumption.” Thus, one of the chief targets of
social ecology has been termed the “all-pervasive, nihilistic
culture of consumption” (Clark 1998, p. 355). But more
mainstream social scientists like Juliet Schor and Robert
Wuthnow have also criticized consumerism (Schor 1998;
Wuthnow 1996).
Most critics oppose consumption for reasons that are
external to consumption. In their view, the problem of
consumerism would be solved if we could overcome the
externalities of consumption so that people could harm-
lessly consume to their hearts’ content. Ecologists, of
course, criticize consumption because it ruins the environ-
ment. Consumption will be fine once it takes a sustainable
form. Ecological devastation is also one of the reasons why
Juliet Schor advises a turn to a simpler life (Schor 1998, pp.
xiii, 145). A second reason of hers, one that many econo-
mists stressed in the eighties, is insufficient savings. Sav-
ings, however, are intended for investment in research and
development, capital goods, and infrastructure so that the
production of consumer goods can be secured and ex-
panded.
Both Schor and Wuthnow oppose consumption because
of its displacement effect. Consumption displaces leisurely
enjoyment or the devotion to family, community, or reli-
gion. Here, consumption in excess of sustenance is not
criticized as such. Within appropriate limits it remains un-
challenged.
To this rough conception of the detriments of consump-
tion corresponds an equally simple notion of its attractive-
ness. “Man is an acquisitive animal,” says Lester Thurow,
“whose wants cannot be satisfied. This is not a matter of
advertising and conditioning, but a basic fact of existence”
(Thurow 1981, p. 120). Wuthnow casts this condition in
moral terms and calls it greed or materialism (Wuthnow
1996, pp. 26, 121, 272–276). But consumption as a basic
fact of existence is, if anything, limited and steady. For
Juliet Schor, consumption is the method by which we es-
tablish and convey our standing in society (Schor 1998, pp.
25–63). That is certainly so, but so far consumption does
not differ from other means of distinction, such as educa-
tion, heritage, denomination, and profession.
The external reasons for criticizing consumption deserve
attention and support. There is one more cause that should
make us look at consumption critically—social injustice.
Extravagant consumption ties up wealth that should be used
to help the poor. But if the intrinsic attractiveness of con-
sumption is not understood, we do not know what we are up
against in our attempts at moderating consumption. Simi-
larly, if we fail to grasp the intrinsic liabilities of consump-
tion, we deprive ourselves of the means to break the spell of
consumption. And finally, what we need to explain is not
consumption in its basic or general form, but rather that
pecies of consumption that is paradigmatic for our time.
PARADIGMATIC CONSUMPTION
We can begin to get a grip on paradigmatic consumption
by considering its linkage to materialism. The devotion to
material things can be an honorable and morally admirable
orientation. Architecture, sculpting, and painting are mate-
rialist in this broad sense and so is the performance of
music. Becoming intimate with a material thing, an instru-
ment, is the burden and the delight of a musician. The same
can be said of most sports. Success in skiing or tennis
depends on one’s finesse and strength in dealing with an
eminently material environment.
Paradigmatic consumption, to the contrary, attenuates
human engagement with material reality. To understand this
ironical turn of events we must go back to one of the
founding promises of the modern era, the promise of liberty
and prosperity. Liberty in this instance is ontological rather
than political, the liberation not from the feudal order but
from the pains and confinements of a recalcitrant reality—
hunger, illness, cold, ignorance, immobility. This promise
was part of the burst of inquisitiveness and energy that has
ushered in a global development. Its theoretical side was
science, its practical side, technology. The latter first man-
ifested itself in widespread and inspired tinkering that im-
proved the production and quality of daily implements. In
the second half of the nineteenth century, scientific theory
joined and potentiated technology.
The promise of technology became an enormously fruit-
ful and beneficial reality. And yet, though originally plau-
sible and applaudable, it underwent subtle and fatal changes
that to this day are poorly understood. The drive to render
the blessings of technology ever more refined and effective
led to more and more complicated technological devices.
Writing utensils were intelligible implements until the mid-
dle of this century, styluses that left a trace of graphite
through abrasion (pencils) or a line of ink dispensed by a
pen (fountain pen) or ball (ballpoint). Writing machines
consisted of levers that impressed the relief of a letter
through a pigment-saturated ribbon on a page (typewriters).
When typewriters became electric, the intelligibility of
their machinery began to be veiled in obscurity. Today,
word processing plus printing rests on such a complex
apparatus of electronics and mechanics that the details of its
working are impenetrable to most users. One gain of this
development has been far greater ease of writing, gratefully
acknowledged by those of us who made the transition from
typewriter to word processing. Another gain is the much
more refined appearance of written documents. The loss in
this development has been the removal of the writer from
the heft and feel of the earlier writing utensils and, if
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anecdotal evidence is to be trusted, less succinctness and
clarity of writing.
There is a pattern to the abstraction of some valued
function or object from its tangible circumstances and to the
concealment of the machinery that provides for the free-
floating availability of the valued item. What is abstracted
may be called the commodity, and the technological sub-
strate it rests on, the machinery of a device (Borgmann
1984). If you trace the development of the automobile from
the Model T to a contemporary model, you can see how the
machinery—the engine, drivetrain, brakes, lights, and so
forth—shrank and became more concealed and less intelli-
gible to the layperson and how at the same time the com-
modity—personal transportation—improved in accommo-
dation, speed, and safety. The most dramatic example of the
shrinking and increasingly powerful and opaque machinery
is the computer. In its first and relatively feeble incarnation
(the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer
[ENIAC]), it was a behemoth occupying an entire room and
exhibiting its functions in arrays of vacuum tubes, resistors,
capacitors, mechanical switches, and cables. Consider now
one of the contemporary endpoints of the computer’s evo-
lution, the notebook computer. It is incomparably more
powerful and easier to use, while its machinery has shrunk
to the point where the factors limiting its size are the
requirements our bodies impose on it—the size of our hands
and the sight of our eyes.
This pattern of development has asserted itself in manu-
facturing, transportation, and most consequentially in do-
mestic life. The refrigerator, the microwave, the television
set, the lamps, the furnace, and air-conditioning provide
food, entertainment, light, and a pleasant temperature in the
commodious way suggested by the word commodity, and
these commodities are supplied by machineries that are
concealed from view and understanding.
AN ALTERNATIVE CRITIQUE: THE
DEVICE PARADIGM
The defining development of modern technology, then, is
the rise of the device paradigm, the distinctive conjunction
of an easily available commodity and a sophisticated and
impenetrable machinery. It has changed the nature of con-
sumption fundamentally. In premodern and early modern
times, consumption rarely took place at a great distance
from production. In most cases, in fact, the burdens of
production reached and enveloped the point of consump-
tion. The bread on the table came from an oven nearby. The
water in the jug was drawn from a well the day before.
There was no dinner for a family if none was cooked by
some (female) member of the family. There was no news
from the neighboring village unless someone walked the
distance between the villages and conveyed the news in his
or her head.
As technology progressed, more and more of these bur-
dens were taken over by some machinery and disappeared
from view. In the experience of consumption, the consumer
good detached itself from the context of its production and
became instantly and easily available. Consumption became
unencumbered enjoyment. One of the attractions of para-
digmatic consumption lies in the purity of pleasure it prom-
ises. There is pleasure in a hard run, in cooking and serving
a fine meal, in reading poetry to one another. But these
pleasures are mixed up with strain, exertion, work, or men-
tal effort. What humans have dreamed of in the stories of
flying carpets and rock candy mountains is pleasure un-
mixed with pain. The objects of such pleasures are com-
modities, and their enjoyment is consumption. Thus, we
demand lean and healthy bodies without the pain of running,
gourmet meals without the bother of cooking, entertainment
without the labor of staging and deciphering it. But remem-
ber that the mortals whom the gods want to punish have
their wishes fulfilled.
Paradigmatic consumption degrades the symmetry of hu-
manity and reality. This decline remains hidden from us
because it comes in the guise of liberation from labor and
discomfort. Disburdenment in turn promises unprecedented
riches. It would have been possible to retain the ties of the
blessings of technology to exertion and responsibility. We
could have made clean and plentiful water available by
having four public faucets for each city block. We could
have refused to develop television and provided entertain-
ment solely through theaters and public libraries. But then
getting water or a book would have taken much time. Now
that water and entertainment are available at home and at
our fingertips, there is room for a cornucopia of pleasures.
In paradigmatic consumption, liberty takes the form of
disburdenment and prosperity the form of limitless avail-
ability of consumer goods.
THE PRINCIPLE OF SYMMETRY
The principle of symmetry between reality and humanity
says that the quality of the human condition and the quality
of the material environment tend toward one and the same
level. One reason our heroes have always been cowboys is
that their posture, their clothing, and their faces directly
reflect the grace of their horses and the grandeur of the
West. Or so the advertisements had it. The ambiguities and
shadows that have enveloped the cowboy indicate that
things are not that simple.
To discover what sort of symmetry between human be-
ings and their surroundings obtains in paradigmatic con-
sumption, it is helpful to remember how humans first
evolved and adjusted to their environment. Human evolu-
tion is the grand spectacle of an animal becoming open and
attuned to ever higher levels and dimensions of reality.
What evolutionary theory tells us in addition is that if the
symmetry at whatever level fails to be well tuned, the
animal species is bound to disappear. Fine attunement, to
the contrary, is deeply pleasant.
The human enterprise of technology began to dislocate
the natural symmetry when it detached pleasures from their
context of exertion. In the process, the factors that used to
temper our desires were overcome and eliminated, and our
desires began to run wild. The consequent damage is most
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evident in the case of food. More than half of the population
in this country is overweight. Our slack and shapeless
bodies are symmetrical to the world of limitless and unen-
cumbered food. A similar if less visible decline of vigor and
definition has debilitated our mental lives. The common
command of science, literature, history, politics, and eco-
nomics is deplorably low.
Limitless wants and insatiable acquisitiveness are natural
facts only in the unnatural setting of overabundance. The
natural setting kept human appetites within bounds. Over-
abundance holds for information and entertainment no less
than for the consumption of sugar and fat. After each
episode of overconsumption we feel defeated and dejected,
vowing moderation and self-discipline. But before long our
craving returns, and we indulge ourselves once again.
We attempt to find a constructive response to this vicious
circle by trying to regain the sense of freedom and richness
that has animated technological progress for so long. Ad-
vertisements typically play on this yearning and stage the
promise of liberty and prosperity with ever renewed inven-
tiveness and finesse. And there is in fact a surge of real
pleasure when first we get a car with air-conditioning and
we are rid of dusty winds and sweat-soaked clothes. We feel
richer when a new satellite link gives us access to television
channels from all continents.
But these are parasitic pleasures. Their strength depends
on the contrast of burdens and limits. Once the new plea-
sures have devoured and displaced the recollection of en-
cumbrances, the pleasures themselves begin to fade. The
newly acquired devices fade into the context of what we
take for granted. Lately certain kinds of advertisements have
appealed to the rueful consumer with a knowing sort of
cynicism. ABC television had an advertisement that asked:
“It’s a beautiful day, what are you doing outside?” (Barron
1998).
There is, however, something profoundly incomplete, if
not misleading, in analyzing the change of symmetry on the
human side only. It is true that paradigmatic consumption
leaves the variety and depth of our faculties feeble and
atrophied. But if the analysis is taken no further, the most
plausible cure within a technological culture is to design
devices that call on a greater range of abilities than does the
ingestion of food, sights, and sounds. Proponents of infor-
mation technology are willing to indict the passivity of
consumption and offer in its place interactive pleasures. But
eventually, computer games and chat rooms leave us as
sullen as television, chips, and beer.
FOCAL THINGS AND PRACTICES
What paradigmatic consumption displaces on the real
side of the original symmetry are things that have a life and
dignity of their own—mountains, works of art, playing
fields, and sacred places. We can call such things focal and
the devotion to them a focal practice. In the culture of the
table, the food and its setting are the focal things. The
preparation of the meal, the gathering around the table, and
the customs of serving, eating, and conversing are the focal
practices. Focal things and practices disclose the world
about us—our time, our place, our heritage, our hopes—and
center our lives. They lead us to say: “There is no place I
would rather be. There is nothing I would rather do. There
is no one I would rather be with.”
The paradigm of the technological device that underlies
paradigmatic consumption suggests erroneously that the
pleasures of these things and practices can be detached from
their actual context and made available by some technolog-
ical device—the elevation of a mountain by a travelogue,
the drama of theater by a television show, the community of
a Thanksgiving celebration by e-mail. The availability of a
commodity, however, occludes or destroys the commanding
presence of focal things and practices. Thus, sorrow at the
loss of the real world deepens the dismay at our loss of
physical and mental strength.
Disengagement and the weakening of our faculties are
intrinsic to paradigmatic consumption. It would be tedious
and faintly ridiculous to try and deepen one’s children’s
appreciation of a dinner that arrived on their laps from the
refrigerator via the microwave by recounting the marvels of
industrial agriculture, food production, refrigeration, and
microwave physics. Your children want to consume televi-
sion while they are consuming their food. Nor is there much
sense in trying to become an elegant and masterful operator
of a CD player and amplifier. As a rule, a technological
device does not offer enough variety and resistance of
interaction to allow expert users to distinguish themselves
from intermediates.
There are, to be sure, exceptions and mixed cases. A
sports car can challenge your skills. An electric piano or
guitar can provoke virtuoso playing. But the general ten-
dency is to render commodities ever more instantaneous,
ubiquitous, easy, and safe, that is, ever more skill-repellent.
The development of the personal computer is the most
recent example. One must remember, however, that the
world of labor and production (as opposed to leisure and
consumption), though deeply marked by the device para-
digm, continues to require and reward skill.
For most people, it is their free time (as distinguished
from working time) that they consider truly their own and
the sanctuary of their deepest aspirations. Paradigmatic con-
sumption has invaded and degraded this realm, and most of
us react with resignation. When the American Academy of
Pediatrics advised parents not to let their children watch
television during their first two years and in their later years
not to let them have a television set or computer in their
rooms, the parents interviewed by the media found those
suggestions unrealistic (Mifflin 1999). In part, this reaction
simply reflects the entrenchment of paradigmatic consump-
tion.
More broadly, however, the entire exchange shows that
the moral significance of paradigmatic consumption is
clouded to the point of concealment. Pediatricians would
not presume to make recommendations on moral grounds.
Ethics is a private or religious matter. The parents on their
part have no private or religious discourse to fall back on in
their attempt to answer a critique of paradigmatic consump-
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tion exclusively on the basis of health. Some of the churches
inveigh against greed and materialism. But parents sense
rightly that an affirmative attitude toward the material world
can be morally appropriate. They also know that greed,
constrained by law and the market, makes for a more
hopeful society than renunciation or apprehension.
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTED
DIRECTIONS
What then? The first point that needs to be made is a moral
one in a new key. Paradigmatic consumption is not a crime, a
sin, or an evil in the traditional sense. But it is intrinsically
disengaging. If it dominates our leisure, it debilitates our phys-
ical and mental vigor and displaces or destroys focal things and
practices. The second point is the acknowledgment that para-
digmatic consumption and the culture of technology are so
intertwined that a complete return to a life of engagement is no
longer possible or desirable. From these two points follows the
third. We should within limits accept paradigmatic consump-
tion appreciatively and cheerfully. But the gains of safety, ease,
space, and time carry an obligation to clear a central space in
our lives for the engagement with focal things and practices.
Safety, ease, ubiquity, and instantaneity are features we
should accept and even improve when it comes to health,
transportation, and utilities. Within this technological set-
ting we must make room for engagements such as the
culture of the table, the culture of the word, the culture of
the arts, for athletics, and for philosophy and religion.
Devotion to focal things and practices will break the spell of
paradigmatic consumption and free up wealth for environ-
mental stewardship and social justice.
Aspirations of this sort cannot afford to be naive about
paradigmatic consumption. It is deeply entrenched and hu-
miliatingly seductive. It is the default culture that clicks in
wherever moral ignorance or indecision prevail. It takes a
principled and communal dedication to focal concerns if a
life of engagement is to prosper.
To counter the promise of liberty and prosperity that
speaks from every advertisement in support of paradigmatic
consumption, the engaging life needs an initial appeal of its
own. It must be the appeal to excellence and gratitude. We
all aspire to excellence and realize that paradigmatic con-
sumption is not the place to attain and practice it. We would
also like to be graced by things and practices that enduringly
gladden our hearts, and we must admit that the rush of
gratitude prompted by a new toy is fickle and fleeting. The
promise of excellence and gratitude may draw us to focal
things and practices. If the promise succeeds in doing so, it
will become superfluous. Focal things and practices are their
own reward.
All this is said in a hopeful vein, and social research is
needed to test and temper it. The distinction between devices
and focal things is foreign to social science and the Census
Bureau. There is at best scattered and indirect evidence on how
people divide their time and money between focal things and
practices and the acquisition and paradigmatic consumption of
commodities. Although worthy beginnings have been made by
consumer researchers such as Mick and Fournier (1998) and
Thompson (1994), there is still little evidence on how aware
consumers are of the difference between focal engagement and
paradigmatic consumption.
More generally, prosperity can be divided into wealth and
affluence. Wealth is the condition where social arrange-
ments are conducive to focal practices and to communal
celebrations (i.e., focal practices writ large). Affluence is the
social condition that encourages paradigmatic consumption.
Little is known about the balance or imbalance of wealth
and affluence and, once more, on the general awareness of
that distinction. Nor is there much discussion of the role or
responsibility government has in adjusting the balance.
Finally, it is still unclear why the attractiveness of para-
digmatic consumption is so persistent. The history of tech-
nology has recorded the grand hopes and predictions that
have greeted the arrival of newspapers, of electricity, of the
radio, of the telephone, of television, and it has often been
left to the reader to compare the halcyon pronouncements
with the sobering results. Similar forecasts about informa-
tion technology have once again captured much of the
public imagination. Why is there no collective memory of
the earlier disappointments? Research is needed both to
answer these questions and to determine whether the ques-
tions are the right ones in the first place.
[Received August 1999. Revised September 1999. David
Glen Mick served as editor-elect for this article.]
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